This paper addresses the methodological issue of what data can safely be disregarded in the quest for a good analysis of a given semantic phenomenon. I argue that as there is no objective measure for this, making the temptation to adjust the terrain to the map hard to resist, it is strongly advisable to make use of text corpora in formal semantic research. I illustrate this argument by considering in some detail the recent history of research on Free Choice items.
INTRODUCTION: FROM DATA TO FACTS IN SEMANTICS
It has not been customary to base formal semantic analyses on corpus studies. On the contrary, many studies in formal semantics have been based on a small number of select examples, simplified or constructed. To be sure, this has some good reasons. However, a formal semantic analysis is very sensitive to the constitution of the facts. Analyses, and ultimately theories, are dependent on the interpretation of the data. And the interpretation of the data in turn depends on the selection of the data. Of course, a conscientious selection may ensure a sound coverage. But since there is no standard of conscientiousness in this regard, there is a risk that accounts are influenced by a biased empirical basis.
I will first review some reasons that idealization is necessary in formal semantics. I will then consider some ways in which it is dangerous to rely on selective data, and argue that corpora can help us avoid such pitfalls. In section 2, these points are illustrated through the controversy over the proper analysis of Free Choice items.
Simplification and simplicity
Simplification is a necessary tactic in semantic research. Regardless of the topic, it is essential to disregard distracting factors and to abstract away from independent problems. As formulated by Lyons (1991: 3),
The second reason [that semantics is not concerned with the totality of linguistic meaning] is that linguists by necessity idealize the phenomena selected and considered as data. They consider utterances in a methodologically and theoretically specific perspective. In fact, linguistics can be subdivided into several overlapping subdisciplines, both regarding the phenomena under consideration and regarding the methodological abstractions determining their scientific treatment.
When doing formal semantics, we simplify at two levels -at the level of performance, concerning data, and at the level of competence, concerning facts. We simplify data to form a coherent set of facts and we simplify facts to fit a theory. Both are covered by the term IDEALIZATION (cf. e.g. Partee 1979:2f.) .
There are some good reasons for idealizing facts and data in formal semantics. The theoretical ideal of formal elegance (Partee 1995:348) constitutes a pressure on us to concentrate on 'core' aspects of a phenomenon, hoping that the analysis will eventually extend to those aspects that remain ill-understood. It may be true that 'the tools with which semantic structures can be individuated and described on the model-theoretic approach are many and varied, since there is no a priori limit on the metalanguage with which models are constructed or described' (Partee 1993:16) , but there is a pull towards recycling tools which have done good work before and thus to view some facts as better than other facts. It is all right for our analysis to not fit all the facts as long as it fits the right, the 'core' facts.
To find the facts, it is moreover necessary to simplify the data. We abstract away from irrelevant detail and inessentials. The average length of an example sentence is of course well below that of a real sentence. We cannot solve all problems at once, and some problems are arguably pragmatic, not semantic, in nature. Furthermore, due to compositionality and what might be termed the 'fragment heritage', the data we do introduce should be tractable. Phenomenona which are not very well understood, or where the proper treatment is controversial or very complex, tend to be avoided in combination with the phenomenon we are interested in. As DPs, for instance, proper names are overrepresented. In sum, we do not have to consider all data, as long as we do consider the right, the 'core' data.
Deduction and seduction
But what are the 'right data', and what are the 'right facts'? There is a tension between empirical coverage and theoretical quality. Of course, as formulated by Partee (1995:348) , ' [i]f we can find analyses with a high degree of both formal elegance and empirical generality, we can suspect that we are on the right track'. But sometimes, we can only find analyses with a high degree of formal elegance, and the question is then what degree of empirical generality is sufficient to sustain our suspicion that we are on the right track.
The criteria for what counts as 'core' data and 'core' facts are varied, but one criterion seems to stand out: core data are clear and plentiful data, data which are easy to interpret and which can easily be multiplied, and core facts are facts based on such data. Such data must be represented, and such facts must not be set aside without serious qualms.
However, it may be far from trivial to know what constitutes a set of core data, and to draw the line between the constitution of data and the constitution of facts. It may be difficult to decide which data belong together, and what data are clear. Selecting a set of simple sentences, you cannot be sure that you do not miss out some factor with which the phenomenon under scrutiny interacts in an interesting way, or generally an interesting class of cases. Making choices on these issues may involve an interpretation of the data, influenced by hypotheses you already have in mind.
The conscientious semanticist will, of course, strive to establish a balanced set. Most progress made in semantic analysis has been based on data chosen with care. The semanticist usually knows the language and draws data from a range of sources, often impressionistically, but conscientiously, with an acute sense of truth to reality and awareness of potential problems. But since there is no universally acclaimed standard of conscientiousness, there is no way of knowing whether or not she has subconsciously been led to select amenable data.
So far, the situation in semantics is no different from the situation in syntax. However, data selection is an all the more critical point in semantics because here, the facts are less black and white, making the constitution of the facts a more complex affair. The question is not just whether a sentence is acceptable, but also whether it entails another sentence; indeed, in the last instance, what it expresses. Moreover, it can be difficult to distinguish between the contribution of an item and the contribution of the context where the item more or less regularly occurs and thus to know how much meaning to attribute to the item. Also, it may be difficult to draw the line between data and facts: judgments about meaning, which are data but which are also themselves interpretations, easily fade into interpretations of themselves, i.e. constitution of facts.
For these reasons, it is crucial to ensure that the examples are representative. Otherwise, we can have a 'nocuous idealization': a covert simplification of facts, hidden behind selected data. Data selection can be a way of interpreting data and constituting facts without admitting it.
In corpore sano
According to Partee (1995:322) , compositional semantic analysis is typically a matter of working backward from intuitions about sentences' truth-conditions and reasoning our way among alternative hypotheses; citing Cresswell (1982) , Partee refers to intuitions about sentences' truth-conditions as the most concrete data we have. But if concreteness is a criterion, it might be added that the most concrete data one can have are intuitions about the truth-conditions of concrete sentences -such as found in a corpus.
We will see in section 2 that even clear and plentiful data can be disregarded when semanticists are not required to consider a random sample and to recognize every substantial class of clear cases. It will be seen that a corpus can force us to revise old hypotheses and that it can inspire new ones. Corpora offer an insurance against nocuous idealizations, where relevant aspects are disregarded and core facts are missed, by laying bare the relation between raw and interpreted data so it is open for inspection; and they offer a constructive means of assisting the imagination, guiding the researcher towards facts which would otherwise not be thought of.
The obvious way to ascertain representativity in examples is to consider a corpus, to base the semantic analysis on a corpus study. Of course, a corpus can never give us a piece of negative data, and it can never provide us with a minimal pair. Strictly, a corpus does not even offer data, for semantic data include judgments. But it can offer realistic points of departure for constructing minimal pairs and negative data, and it can supply circumstantial evidence of intuitions about truth conditions.
A corpus can be used in various ways, of course. The impressionistic method, where you look till you find what you like or want, can be contrasted with a 'naturalistic', systematic method, which carries a commitment to count whatever emerges as core data. This latter method is what is meant by actually basing an analysis on a corpus study. Using this, you are not only insured against subconsciously or semiconsciously discounting core data, but you can also hope to receive better impulses towards a fruitful hypothesis than you do from the examples you could invent -reality often surpasses the researcher's imagination.
Below, I present evidence of these points in a specific domain, a case study where corpora can be attested to make a definite difference. I review the treatment of one class of phenomena in formal semantics, showing how, indeed, analyses have been based on atypical data and fail to generalize to typical data, and illustrating the need for basing the constitution of facts in a semantic domain on corpus studies. I will also discuss some methodological issues concerning the treatment of corpus data for eliciting semantic judgments -primarily, how to use substitutions.
THE FC CONTROVERSY
Free Choice items (FCIs) are items like the English determiner any as it occurs in (1) or the English pronoun anybody as it occurs in (2a).
(1) In the first year they were married, Ted had gone to work for a lithographer;
he (Giannakidou 1997 (Giannakidou , 2001 Quer 1999) seem to have as much in common with the PSI any(-) or the item some (-) . Even when we concentrate on English, there is no consensus on the analysis. The following two basic questions about FCIs remain controversial:
• What are the constraints on their distribution? • Do they have a universal quantificational force?
That there are constraints on the distribution is shown by (2d). The controversy is over where to draw the line between this and, say, (2e) and how to formulate the correct generalization.
(2) d. #She was a woman who had been seduced by anybody.
e. She was a woman who could be seduced by anybody.
In (1) and (2a) above, the FCI would seem to express a universal quantification. However, it has been argued that this is only apparent (Kadmon & Landman 1993) . Sometimes, the universality can instead be attributed to other factors, and it would be satisfying from a theoretical point of view to generalize this picture. Below, I will review the use of data in the recent debate over these issues. The primary methodological interest in this lies in the fact that the theoretically preferable analysis just alluded to can be shown to be empirically in tune with no more than half the data. This I will not show for English directly, but for Scandinavian, more accurately, for the hypothesis as carrying over to Scandinavian.
In Scandinavian, there is a paradigm of FCIs which seems to correspond very closely to the English any(-) semantically, only that there is no PSI interpretation: the wh-, question word based paradigm is distinct from PSIs. Scandinavian FCIs furthermore constitute a good testing ground for a systematic use of corpora because they are very easily retrievable. I will concentrate on Norwegian and Swedish when I confront the stances taken in the FC controversy with results from corpus studies underlying Saebø (1999 Saebø ( , 2001 .
Morphologically, the FCI consists of a wh-word (a pronoun, a determiner or an adverb) and the locution som helst, which might be glossed as, first, 'that' or 'as', a relative subjunction or an equative particle, and second, 'rathest', the superlative of an adverb which in the comparative corresponds to 'rather'.
The first issue I consider is whether FCIs are more like universals or more like existentials, or indefinites -the Universalist versus the Existentialist hypothesis, and how corpus data can be taken to support one or the other hypothesis.
Universalism versus Existentialism
As shown by Horn (2000) , there is a long ongoing debate over whether FCIs -first and foremost, English any(-) -are basically universal or existential (or indefinite), and both theses have been defended in various ways. As it seems, some data are more amenable to one view, others to another. Since most or all sentences where an FCI occurs have a universal interpretation, the 'existentialist' has to show that this is not inherent in the item but comes from something in the context, or at least that it comes about indirectly, not through the item qua quantifier. First, I review the most influential recent existentialist contribution, Kadmon & Landman (1993) , arguing that FCIs are parasitic on generics.
FCIs as parasites on generics
The two uses of the determiner any, as a PSI and as an FCI, seem to be related, so from a semantic minimalist perspective, it is desirable that they be described as variants of one item with one meaning. This must basically be the meaning of the indefinite article, for the PS variant is clearly indefinite. According to Kadmon & Landman (1993) , FC any is, just like PS any, an indefinite with additional semantic and pragmatic characteristics. The problem is that FC any seems to have a universal meaning, but this universality is attributed to a generic quantification outside any. More specifically, when the set denoted by the any argument seems to be subject to a universal quantification, this quantification does not stem from the determiner but from a generic operator or quantifier, which may be covert. Thus the any-phrase gets a bound interpretation in the same way as (other) indefinites can get a bound interpretation. Davison (1980) had already proposed this strategy, but Kadmon & Landman worked it out more thoroughly.
To account for the difference between a and any, they propose that any -whether PS or FC -induces a widening of the interpretation of its argument and that this widening creates a stronger statement. This theoretical aspect of their theory I have assessed elsewhere (Saebø 2001) . Here I concentrate on the empirical prediction for In the introduction to the section on FC any, they write:
The discussion . . . will be limited to cases of FC any like [ (4)], that is, to simple generic statements. . . . We think that the analysis extends to modal cases like [ (8)], but the particular problems posed by the interaction between any and modals go beyond the scope of this paper. (Kadmon & Landman 1993:405f.) The empirical prediction quoted above -that NPs with FC any are allowed in the same kind of environment where generic indefinites are allowed -implies that • it makes sense to substitute any for a whenever the latter is bound by a generic operator, and that • substituting a for FC any makes sense and results in an interpretation where the indefinite is bound by a generic operator.
Both predictions can be falsified; in fact, the second can be falsified by utterances of sentences like (7)- (9) above, with an overt counterfactual operator, such as (1) above, or (10a).
(10) a. Ruth resigned herself to the irony of reading a murder mystery; but, at the moment, Ruth would have read anything to escape her own imagination.
(WIDOW:381) b. ?Ruth resigned herself to the irony of reading a murder mystery; but, at the moment, Ruth would have read a thing to escape her own imagination.
(10b) is odd no matter what is accented; would, a, or thing. Kadmon & Landman explicitly limit the discussion to cases like (4), 'simple generic statements'. Here, or in a sentence like (11a), the substitution of the indefinite article does make sense and result in a bound interpretation.
(11) a. Ruth was still struggling to keep her memories of the past under control, as any widow must. (WIDOW:468) b. Ruth was still struggling to keep her memories of the past under control, as a widow must.
However, when we turn to Scandinavian, Norwegian and Swedish, and a sample of 1000 cases from a general source corpus of either language, it turns out that this paradigmatic case is rare. On the other hand, close to 50% of the occurrences of FCIs are modal cases like (8), more accurately, possibility modal contexts. Now, in a majority of the possibility contexts, the substitution of an indefinite fails to result in an interpretation where this is bound by a generic operator; often the sentence becomes uninterpretable. This is to some extent correlated with the variant of possibility, or, with reference to the theory of Kratzer (1991) , the type of conversational background. We encounter the full spectrum: epistemic, normative and circumstantial, corresponding to epistemic possibility, permission and ability or disposition. Evidently, the indefinite substitution can make sense when the conversational background is normative or circumstantial, but often it does not (S stands for Swedish and N stands for Norwegian): (12) 
Oslo. Oslo
In these cases, then, there is no independent evidence for a covert generic operator binding the FCI. One could argue that the FCI induces a genericity less available with the regular indefinite, but this would come close to saying that the FCI has an inherent universality after all, and to circularity. Even outside the possibility contexts, FCIs are allowed in many environments where generic indefinites are not. Elliptic conditionals -simple sentences with a conditional structure -divide into two classes, one where the indefinite substitution makes sense and another where it does not. This seems to depend on whether the FCI is the only accented item: if it is, the indefinite version is uninformative. (16) 
idrett. sport
This seems to indicate that the counterfactual operator does not bind an indefinite the way a generic operator would and that the FCI does not get its universality from that operator.
We can conclude that Scandinavian FCIs are allowed in many -and 'many' in a proportional sense -environments where generic indefinites are not, contrary to Kadmon & Landman's postulate as applied to Scandinavian. If we now turn to the other side of this postulate, we discover that in many contexts where generic indefinites are allowed, Scandinavian FCIs are not. It is not true that it makes sense to substitute an FC phrase for an indefinite whenever the indefinite is bound by a generic operator. There are two stumbling blocks for this substitution, and both seem to show that the FCI has a quantificational force of its own.
First, substitution in this direction makes us aware that while indefinites can have a bound interpretation both in simple and complex sentences, a reminiscent interpretation of the FCI only seems possible in simple sentences. An indefinite introduced in an 'if' or a 'when'-clause is commonly considered to be bound by an overt or covert conditional or generic operator; but an FCI does not readily lend itself to such an interpretation. The fact that sentences like (18b) or (19b) tend to be odd suggests that the FCI is a quantifier, sensitive to scope islands. (18) 
tracts-the
Second, an indefinite can, in a simple sentence, be bound by a covert or an overt generic or frequency operator, such as 'normally' or 'usually'; but, as has been pointed out by Dayal (1998) , it seems that an FCI cannot be bound by an overt generic operator or an adverb of quantification. In (20b), in contrast to (20a), the adverb does not quantify over letters but only over possible circumstances or courses of events; in (21b), where the predicate is individual-level, the FCI does not seem to be allowed, to make sense at all. This can be taken to indicate that the adverb is not a genuine generic operator in that it cannot quantify only over worlds. 
by. city
To sum up, it seems clear that the view that FCIs borrow their universality from a generic operator is, as applied to Scandinavian, empirically ill-founded.
Universalism: parallel evidence
Let us briefly consider another type of data which may have relevance for the debate over whether FCIs are existentials or universals. A parallel corpus between a language like English and a language like German, where there are no clear FCIs, can provide circumstantial evidence in favor of the universalist hypothesis. Strikingly many occurrences of FC any are in fact translated by a regular universal determiner; indeed, specifying that any corresponds to jed-or all-turns out to be an efficient means of retrieving FC cases without excluding too much.
(22) a. Mechanically it is not much more complicated than a sewing machine, and any reasonably competent blacksmith can repair it. b. Die Mechanik ist kaum komplizierter als bei einer Nähmaschine, und jeder einigermassen geschickte Hufschmied kann es reparieren. (23) Of course, the interpretation of such data poses special methodological problems. For one thing, one has to acknowledge that in a number of cases, the universal in the German version is supplemented by some modal item, like beliebig 'arbitrary' or denkbar 'imaginable', as in (26b) (where the universal phrase is further supplemented by an adjunct expressing indiscrimination), and (27b) (where the adjective is in turn modified by the particle nur 'only'); and even in (24b), the determiner is not just jedbut the complex indefinite-universal (not well-understood) ein-jed-.
(26) a. Rawlings could take just about any lock in manufacture. b. Rawlings konnte jedes beliebige Schloss knacken, ganz gleich um welches Fabrikat es sich handelte. (27) a. And the men were bribed with cigarettes to do any favours one required.
b. Und die Männer wurden mit Zigaretten bestochen, einem jeden nur denkbaren Gefallen zu tun.
And even the cases where the determiner translating any is a simple universal only show that it is possible to express (approximately) the same meaning with a regular universal as with any in such contexts where any is felicitous; not, strictly, that any has a universal meaning -it might be, say, as argued by Davison (1980) , Kadmon & Landman (1993) and others, that the context expresses a universality and the FC element in FC any serves to widen or weaken the restriction for this universality, thus strengthening the statement. In the absence of such a widening or weakening item, it could be argued, German has to resort to a universal determiner even though it is not the most efficient means. However, it remains that the parallel data from a language which has to choose between existentials and universals do not provide evidence that FCIs are more closely related to the former than to the latter -rather the opposite.
Beyond Existentialism and Universalism
It might be possible to analyze FCIs neither as (special) existentials (indefinites) nor as (special) universals but as something different altogether, from which a universal interpretation could be derived in a more indirect way. In this section, I examine two such third roads, both amounting to analyzing the FCIs as a kind of definites: the scalar analysis proposed by Lee & Horn (1994) , based on a paraphrase with a superlative, and the preferential analysis suggested, in particular, by the Scandinavian FC morphology, based on a paraphrase with a verb of intention. I show that, ultimately, facts based on corpus data argue against both approaches. Lee & Horn (1994) propose an analysis of FC any in terms of scalar implicature. Scalar implicature is a source of universal quantification, so if scalarity can prove useful in the analysis of FCIs, it will account for the universality associated with them without actually treating them as universal quantifiers; regarding English any this is of course desirable. Many cases in the Scandinavian material lend themselves to a scalar interpretation. However, the hypothesis that FCIs are inherently scalar seems to meet too many counterexamples for a general analysis to be based on it. The hypothesis that FC any is inherently scalar implies that a DP any N can be paraphrased by the DP even the A-est N for an adjective A. The choice of A will depend on the (intrasentential) context, primarily the verb in the sentence, in such a way that the superlative form of A will entail that the sentence frame is (not) true for every N.
The Scalar hypothesis
To be sure, there are many cases of (e-) (h) However, there are many cases where an appropriate adjective is hard to identify, because the relevant entities are not ranked on a scale, even when contextual information is taken into account. We may choose one and try to force a ranking along the corresponding scale, but a scalar implicature will not be generated or, if it is generated, it will fail to bring about a universal interpretation. Consider first (30a). (30) 
helst. (S)
HELST 'In principle, one can make soft drinks from any fruit.' b. One can make soft drinks from even the hardest fruit.
The adjective chosen in (30b) is as good a candidate as any, but we can easily imagine alternatives, like sourest. Regarding soft drink making, fruits are not ordered according to just one but to several scales, and in consequence, the superlative fails to generate a scalar implicature which covers all the cases; from (30b) we can conclude that we can make soft drinks from a soft fruit but not that we can make soft drinks from an A fruit for any other adjective A. Now (30a) is a case where a scalar paraphrase has some plausibility; the larger context might supply sufficient information to narrow down the variation to one dimension. But in what seems a majority of cases, the choice of an adjective seems completely arbitrary and a paraphrase with a superlative gives a barely interpretable sentence, like (31b). We could try to account for such cases by ranking the entities according to likelihood, a notion that has been used for a general analysis of even, choosing a superlative like most unlikely. This may yield reasonably good paraphrases, but the problem is that the notion of likelihood is so vague as to render the analysis rather vacuous: the paraphrase would be designed to ensure a universal interpretation. It may be added that the superlative is in itself not a primitive notion but a notion in need of analysis, and an ultimate analysis can reasonably be assumed to involve a universal quantification.
A literal interpretation: preferential paraphrases
Swedish has a particularly comprehensive paradigm of 'wh'-som helst FC items. The items hur som helst 'how as rathest', and hur A (N) som helst, where A is a gradable adjective and N is a noun, have no direct counterparts in Norwegian. We may ask what is used in this function in Norwegian. One answer is that we choose a paraphrase in terms of a verb of intention. This is part of a more general pattern, suggesting a way to analyze the FC phrases as a sort of definites from which a universality could be derived, much as on the Scalar hypothesis discussed above.
It is often possible to rephrase 'wh'-som helst by a preferential expression; in the case of hur som helst, by an equative construction 'as (A) (as) . . . V', where . . . is a pronoun and V is a verb expressing an intention, typically 'want'. At the same time, 'wh'-som helst is of course literally 'wh-as rathest', that is, the canonical FCI paradigm is based on a similative or relative conjunction and an adverb expressing preference. It would seem that paraphrases in terms of preference might point to a semantic regularity. (32b) and (33b) exemplify the pattern. As mentioned, such paraphrases have a wider use than suppleting the Norwegian 'wh'-som helst paradigm. More generally, 'wh'-som helst can, in Swedish or Norwegian, often be replaced by 'th-(as) . . . want' or by 'wh-(as) . . . want' -that is, by an item composed of either the 'wh'-word or a corresponding demonstrative determiner, pronoun, or adverb, maybe a relative (or similative) conjunction, a DP (usually a pronoun coreferring with another nominal, usually the subject, in the sentence), and, finally, vil (N) or vill (S) or another verb expressing an intention.
In (34) and (35), such a phrase alternates with 'wh'-som helst without a change in meaning.
(34) a. 
antrekk. outfit
There are limits to the use of preferential phrases in this sense. For one thing, they seem to require possibility contexts. Moreover, they seem to be sensitive to the conversational background for the possibility modal. Thus, a 'wh'-som helst item cannot be replaced by a preferential phrase if the modal is used in an epistemic sense. There are evidently still other, subtle restrictions concerning the connection between the conversational background and the intentions of the subject of the preferential phrase, responsible for the slight change in meaning if we substitute such a phrase for 'wh'-som helst in (36a). 
defence-quartet
Despite these restrictions, we might try to centre an analysis of FCIs in general around the cases where the substitution of a preferential phrase is possible, hoping that such an analysis would generalize to the rest of the cases. After all, there are preferential phrases in a wider sense that would work well in cases like (36a) (cf. also (33b)): the verb vil with a personal subject is replaced by skal with an impersonal subject, and the verb 'be' is added. This locution has a use outside possibility contexts in a narrow sense, cf. (37). (36) We might say that while vil expresses an intention in the subject, skal expresses an intention in someone else; this someone could be the coach (in (36c)) or the personnel making wage demands (in (37)). Thus we could maintain that in many cases, the FCI can be explicated by a phrase with a more transparent meaning. We could form a strategy of basing an analysis of 'wh'-som helst on the literal interpretation of phrases like, for (35), 'the outfit they want to play volleyball in'; depending on the context, the paraphrase might vary, but the form of it as a definite description with an expression of choice would be constant.
There are, however, strong reasons not to follow such a strategy. First, the locution with vil(l) is not restricted to agentive or even animate nominals: particularly in 'how' cases, we encounter a use of this preferential phrase that shows it to be strongly grammaticalized and unsuited for a literal analysis: Second, and even more critically, it can be shown (Saebø 1999:22 ) that a literal reading of the preferential phrase is definitely too weak to capture the meaning it has when it can supplant 'wh'-som helst and function as a Free Choice expression. What we can conclude is that any preferential phrase that can replace an FCI has acquired a special meaning in the relevant contexts, less general and grammatical than 'wh'-som helst but more general and grammatical than what we would expect.
The modal context generalization
So far, we have seen how theoretically attractive ideas, inspired by a limited set of selected or constructed examples, can be disproved by considering corpus data in some breadth. In a sense, this is a destructive, however necessary, use of corpus data in semantics. In the following, I will show how, conversely, it is possible to vindicate a theoretically attractive idea which has been criticized in the literature on the basis of artificial data, by considering a wider set of real examples in their contextual variety. This idea is the generalization, which can be traced back at least to Vendler (1967) , that FCIs require a modal (intensional) context. Here, corpus data can be used to support a constitution of the facts which promises a simpler theory, attesting to a constructive or even creative use of such data in semantics.
Covert conditions
Everybody agrees that FCIs have a limited distribution, but different scholars draw the lines differently. Thus Kadmon & Landman (1993) , as we saw in section 2.1.1, formulate a very strict condition, while Dayal (1998) is relatively liberal. The issue is often whether FCIs do require intensional contexts (Carlson 1981) ; the tendency, at any rate, is for them to occur in such contexts. One problem with determining the limits to the distribution of FCIs is that any functions both as a PS and as an FC item, and it may be difficult to discriminate between the two. This is one point where it is useful to consult a language where FCIs are lexically distinct from PSIs. Carlson (1981) discusses the licensing environments of FC any and considers a characterization of them as intensional (modal) contexts. He notes that no overt modal need be present: generic sentences, like (4), with no overt modal, sanction any. 'One could argue . . . that there is an unspoken modal . . . in such examples. There is a variety of other contexts, though, for which no such arguments can be made. Many stative verbs, such as like, many adjectives, and all predicate nominals allow any.' (Carlson 1981:10 Carlson is thus led to characterize the licensing contexts of FC any as either intensional ones or individual-level argument positions. In the light of subsequent research on generics, it seems reasonable to group (42) and (43) together with (4) as generic sentences involving a covert modal. (41), however, does not seem to show the same genericity, so the only licensing feature here would seem to be the individual-level object position of the verb like.
However, a corpus search for FCIs like anyone in the object position of verbs in the simple present in sentences with no overt modal shows that it is very difficult to find verbs that are individual-level with respect to their object. This casts doubt on the assumption that the fact that like is individual-level with respect to its object is responsible for the fact that the FCI is licensed here as well. In fact, the verbs that are retrievable and that are similar in meaning to like are stage-level with respect to their object but have a habitual, conditional interpretation when the object is an FC phrase, with a covert habitual operator and an implicit conditional antecedent. This suggests a reinterpretation of examples like (41) If we adopt a universalist analysis of the FCI, the relevant part of (44) could be paraphrased as follows: 'For every girl x and every person y, if y wants x to sleep with y, x sleeps with y'. Similarly, (41) could be paraphrased 'For every person x, if Bob meets x, he likes x'. Other verbs facilitate a conditional interpretation in carrying a presupposition which is read as an antecedent, e.g. godta 'accept' or betale 'pay'; the relevant part of (46) could be paraphrased 'For every action, if it is committed, the police will let it pass', and (47) could be paraphrased 'For every sum, if I am required to pay it for the operation, I will'. Still other verbs, like passe 'match' or tåle 'endure', clearly have a modal element in their meaning, forming an intensional context for the FCI. The pattern that emerges is that what may seem an extensional context, in this case, a verb like like, turns out, on closer inspection, to fall into line with verbs involved in more complex, implicit intensional contexts. In this way, a more systematic study of data than has been customary can contribute to a reaffirmation of the generalization that FCIs require intensional contexts.
Subtrigging
This generalization has been argued to fail for another class of cases as well: Dayal (1998) emphasizes and in fact bases her analysis of FC any on the observation that this item is licensed in extensional contexts if only the NP is postmodified (this is known as 'SUBTRIGGING'). Her examples include (48a-d).
(48) a. #John talked to any woman.
b. John talked to any woman at the party. c. Yesterday John talked to any woman he saw. d. John talked to any woman who came up to him.
There is no doubt that such a postmodification can be essential for the felicity of an FCI; on the basis of an extensional context where the FCI is infelicitous, it can create a context where the FCI is felicitous. The question is whether the postmodification saves the extensional context or whether it makes the otherwise extensional context intensional. Dayal chooses the former: the context remains extensional but the statement is no longer 'doomed to be false' (Dayal 1998:453) . A search for the Norwegian equivalents of anybody or anything modified by a relative clause -search-string som helst som -yields cases like (49a) and (50a). (49) 
hands-the
These cases are interesting because they suggest that the relative clause facilitates a modal interpretation by providing material to form a conditional antecedent from. To the extent that (49b) is interpretable, it has a conditional interpretation where the presupposition of the verb 'carry out' is accommodated into the antecedent: 'For every action, if Joshua was instructed to carry it out, he did carry it out'. But this interpretation is more readily available in the original sentence, and the reason seems to be that the relative clause 'that the Lord instructed him to' adds descriptive content to the antecedent by satisfying the presupposition. As for (50b), the expression 'did it' is evidently too poor in descriptive content for the presupposition -that (s)he did some certain thing -to be accommodated. In the original sentence, the presupposition is satisfied through the relative clause, and the resulting interpretation is arguably a conditional interpretation where the relative clause expresses the antecedent: 'For every person, if she went ski hiking in remote parts of Krokskogen in 1944-45, she did so with . . . '.
In short, authentic cases where subtrigging plays a role in apparently non-modal contexts seem to point in the direction that the effect can be traced to the need for a modal context, insofar as the postmodification can supply the content material for an otherwise too implicit restrictor of a covert binary modal, conditional or generic, operator. Thus the modal context generalization is again vindicated.
CONCLUSIONS
The review of the recent history of research on Free Choice items has attested some reasons for using data from natural language corpora in natural language semantics, and some ways of going about it.
In this area, influential hypotheses, like the Existentialist hypothesis, have been based on small handfuls of constructed examples. This might be innocuous if only the examples were representative and did not abstract away from essentials; then the hypotheses would in fact be based on a broader range of data, of which, however, only an essence would be represented. This does not turn out to be the case, though.
Any independent evidence for a hypothesis like the Existentialist hypothesis must be based on a substitution argument: it must be possible to substitute a 'regular' existential (indefinite) for the FCI and retain a universal interpretation -not the same interpretation, of course, but at least a reminiscent interpretation. But this fails in several classes of contexts. The proportional weight of such contexts makes it difficult to overlook this failure once corpus data are considered systematically. A similar criticism is valid for related hypotheses, such as the Scalar hypothesis.
The Existentialist hypothesis is a theoretically attractive one, promising a weak theory, so it is understandable that corpus data are not considered at once. But it is important to note that corpus data do not necessarily have a falsificationary function. Concerning the other central controversy in the area, the question whether the items require intensional contexts or not, corpus studies can be seen to support a generalization which has been rejected on the basis of a few constructed examples, and thus indirectly to render a strong theory redundant. Here, the study of corpora serves a constructive purpose, suggesting ways of coping with counterexamples by subsuming them under the general hypothesis.
As I have argued elsewhere (Saebø 2001) , it is possible to unite a 'Universalist hypothesis' (FCIs have a quantificational force) and an 'Intensionalist hypothesis' (FCIs require an intensional context) in a coherent theory. This theory may have its problems, but it does show how a corpus-based constitution of facts can feed a formal semantic analysis and how the corpus basis can make a difference.
